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Abstract
This paper acknowledges that the relationship between log wages and
schooling is considerably more complex than the simple human capital
earnings function suggests and that schooling is endogenous. We es-
timate a model where educational attainment is discrete and ordered
and log wages are determined by a simple function of work experience
for each level of attainment. We distinguish between lifecycle and
cohort effects by exploiting the fact that we have a short panel. We
strongly reject both the usual separability assumption and exogeneity
of educational attainment.
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1 Introduction
Estimating the returns to schooling is a major industry for applied economists.
The methodological difficulty in estimating the causal effect of education is
well known: bias (due to ability, school quality, non-cognitive skill) arising
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from the correlation between wages and the unobservable determinants of
schooling contaminates least squares estimates which can then only be in-
terpreted as an upper bound. There is a large literature that attempts to
address this problem using instrumental variable methods by exploiting po-
tential exclusion restrictions. In this context the simplicity of the workhorse
empirical specification of the human capital earnings function is extremely
convenient. This specification has log wages being determined by an addi-
tively separable and linear function of schooling and a quadratic function of
some measure of experience (usually age). A convenient property of this sim-
ple specification is that there is one rate of return and it can, under certain
assumptions, be equated to the coefficient on schooling. Moreover, there is
econometric convenience associated with such a simple specification: there
is just one variable, schooling, that is endogenous so the search for exclusion
restrictions, that has so taxed the ingenuity of researchers in this area, need
not continue beyond just one. Within the confines of studies that attempt
to deal with endogenous schooling, there have been some attempts to depart
from the simple specification. For example, Willis and Rosen (1979) in their
structural model consider schooling to be a college education endogenous
dummy variable and allow for selection on the interaction between experi-
ence and schooling. Kenny et al. (1979) allow for the minimum schooling
level and use a Tobit specification; and Harmon and Walker (1995) use an
extension of the Heckman two-step approach where the latent variable for
years of schooling is treated as an ordered probit. To the best of our knowl-
edge, all such studies that estimate the effect of endogenous education do so
within a model where schooling is some univariate function of years of school-
ing and assumes that the effect of schooling does not vary across experience
- that is, separability between schooling and experience is a maintained hy-
pothesis. This limitation extends to twins studies (for example Ashenfelter
and Rouse, 1998) where identification is invariably assisted by estimating an
assumed linear relationship between within twin pair earnings difference and
their schooling difference. Here linearity is crucial because there is rather
little variance in the within difference in education levels.
Adopting this maintained hypothesis seems increasingly perverse since
there is considerable evidence (e.g., Heckman et al.,1996, Jaeger and Page,
1996, Hungerford and Solon, 1987) against it. In particular, many studies
suggest that the effect of schooling is not linear, that schooling itself is not
univariate but rather is, at the very least, best thought of as a succession
of levels of achievement that is not simply college vs no college. Moreover,
many studies show that age earnings profiles are certainly not parallel across
education levels (e.g. Neal, 2004 and Heckman et al., 2006). While, one
might argue that such evidence, coming as it does from a framework where
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schooling is treated as exogenous, is subject to some bias - but, nonetheless,
it seems cavalier to ignore its findings altogether. This paper is an attempt
to incorporate the suggestion that the relationship between log wages and
schooling is considerably more complex than the simple human capital earn-
ings function suggests and yet schooling is endogenous.
Our work complements that of Heckman et al. (2008)1: they compute
the internal rate of return (IRR) to the investment in education for different
levels of schooling. They start from a general non parametric approach to
the estimation of the determinants of log earnings but do not explicitly allow
for endogenous schooling. In contrast to that work we adopt a paramet-
ric model but allow for the selection associated with endogenous schooling.
Leaving aside the issue of endogenous schooling, parametric models do have
some advantages over non parametric: they converge faster, they do not re-
quire the estimation of smoothing parameters, they are easy to interpret,
and parametric estimates can be used to extrapolate out of sample. On the
other hand, estimates of parametric models are conditional on the maintained
functional form assumptions. Here we implement what we think of a useful
compromise between generality and tractability. In our selection model edu-
cation is captured by achievement measures that are ordered: from the lower
secondary level of education associated with the minimum school leaving age
(that the US literature thinks of as High School drop-outs), through High
School graduation (around the age of 18), through an undergraduate college
degree (around the age of 21), and up to postgraduate qualifications (less
common in the UK than the US). We estimate the probability that individ-
uals have a particular level of education by exploiting the fact that they are
mutually exclusive and ordered. We then estimate age earnings profiles for
each education achievement group separately, controlling for selection into
each level of educational achievement. Therefore we do not impose separa-
bility, nor do we impose that the schooling has a linear effect on log wages.
Even this simple departure from the usual separable linear framework comes,
of course, at some cost. The assumption that education is a latent variable
that can be captured by an ordered probit is not entirely innocuous: while
the assumption that levels of education of achievement are ordered seems
like a natural one, the assumption that the distribution of the residuals in
the equation that determines academic progression through the education
system are distributed normally is essentially arbitrary. It is only as jus-
tifiable as any other parametric assumption and a long way from the fully
non-parametric (or, even, semi-parametric) approach that might be possible
1A broader extension of this work is included in a authors’ chapter in the Handbook
of Economics of Education (2006), where they focus on many of the issues treated in our
work.
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to estimate.2 Of course, adopting normality makes an important contribu-
tion towards identifying the parameters of interest in our selection model and
sacrificing such a contribution would place a correspondingly greater burden
on the validity of the exclusion restrictions. Given that fully non-parametric
selection models are still in their infancy (see Lanot and Walker, 1998, in the
context of the effect of unions on wages and Das et al, 2003, in the context
of returns to education3), and that studies of the returns to education in-
evitably have to rely on observational data where identification comes from
naturally occurring experiments, we view our own approach as a practical
compromise that could be implemented with many datasets. Here, we use
the UK Labour Force Survey a very large and flexible dataset that is the UK
equivalent of the US CPS data, and has been used extensively elsewhere to
study the returns to education (see, for example, Walker and Zhu, 2008).
A second issue is how to interpret the estimates in a model where endo-
geneity is accounted for. If the effect of education on log wages is subject
to unobservable heterogeneity, as seems reasonable, then it is well known
that IV estimates (and those from other methods that rely on specific exclu-
sion restrictions) have to be interpreted with care. In particular, it has been
shown that the coefficient on schooling can no longer be interpreted as an
average treatment effect and such methods identify the effect of education on
those individuals whose schooling is affected by the exclusion restrictions (see
Moffitt (1999) for a clear exposition of the issues). In most cases, exclusion
restrictions rely on education reforms that affect one cohort of individuals
in an area but not another cohort in the same region, or the same cohort in
a different region. Thus, interpretation is not a trivial problem: in general
we have no way of knowing how a particular exclusion restriction affects the
education decisions on individuals in our data sets. In some cases we might
have strong suspicions that particular types of individuals are affected (for
example, Kling (2001) shows that Card’s proximity IV affected low income
youth more) and, if we are lucky, the estimates might then be informative
about particular policy issues. For example, changes in minimum school
leaving ages have been used quite extensively (see, e.g. Harmon and Walker,
1995) and in this case one might imagine that the reform affects those who
intended to leave education at an age below the new minimum. Thus, such
estimates may be relevant for policy that is directed towards low ability
and/or credit constrained individuals (although, Cameron and Taber (2004)
using several methodologies do not find any evidence that borrowing con-
2See, for example, the STATA sneop command of Stewart (2004), and Blundell and
Powell (2004) for a survey of semi-parametric selection models.
3Das et al (2003) develop a non parametric estimator for sample selection models. This
tests for departure from Normality by including higher order terms in the Mills ratio.
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straints affect schooling decisions). Only exceptionally will we be able to
identify the average treatment effect using such methods.4 In practice, the
only exception that is likely to arise is when the exclusion restriction is a
random variable: for example (through a lottery) and even here one needs
to be sure that such a variable has no indirect effects on wages. In general,
in such models, there will be a distribution of treatment effects and what
is actually identified will depend on the exclusion restriction. However, in
the case where the treatment is discrete (as in our ordered probit case) the
distributional assumptions allow the researcher, in principle, to identify the
whole distribution of treatment effects. Thus, while the parametric restric-
tion is strong it buys the researcher a lot of information.
Given that our aim is to estimate the internal rate of return associated
with educational attainments we focus on the lifecycle pattern of earnings at
different educational attainment levels. Thus, given our aim, it is important
that we estimate the true lifecycle effect net of any cohort and/or calendar
time effects. It is, of course, impossible to make such distinctions when
using cross-section data. The data we use here is a sequence of pooled cross-
sections over a period of 13 years which offers better prospects but even here
we should expect significant collinearity problems. Here, we exploit the fact
that our data has a short panel element to it: individuals are interviewed
over 5 quarters and earnings data is collected in the first and final waves -
an interval of approximately one year.
Estimation exploits the availability of both data sets to the maximum.
In particular, we estimate the lifecycle earnings profiles for each education
group using the 1997-2009 pooled longitudinal data, and then, controlling for
the lifecycle, estimate the cohort and year effects, together with the impact
of education, on the level of wages using the pooled cross sections that are
also available from 1997 to 2009. We allow for non-random selection into
each education level.
The distinctive features of this work are: we separately identify lifecycle
and cohort effects, we control for selectivity and our model of earnings and its
growth does not impose the restriction that the age profiles (and the effects
of other observables) are the same at each level of education. We correct for
unobserved ability using, as exclusion restrictions: the raising of the school
leaving age reform (known as RoSLA) that was imposed on the English (and
Welsh) education system from 1973; and the month of birth. The use of
the former is well known. Crawford et al. (2007), analyzing the English
education system, show that children born later in the school year perform
4See Carneiro et al (2010) discussion and implementation of the marginal treatment
effect estimator.
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significantly worse in exams than those born earlier in the school year. There
are no strong reasons for thinking that both RoSLA and month of birth
are correlated with the unobservable determinants of earnings. However,
Buckles and Hungerman (2008) find that season of birth is correlated to
family background in the US. Therefore, it’s an empirical question, whether
it is true in the UK, that the LFS cannot eliminate.
This paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data, in Sec-
tion 3 we explain the estimation method of the returns to education, Section 4
presents the results and Section 5 concludes.
2 Data description
The LFS is a quarterly sample survey of households living at private ad-
dresses. Its purpose is to provide information on the UK labour market that
can then be used to evaluate labour market and educational policies. The
survey seeks information on respondents’ personal circumstances and their
labour market status during a specific reference period, normally a period of
one week or four weeks (depending on the topic) immediately prior to the
interview.
The survey has been conducted on a quarterly basis, with each sample
household retained for five consecutive quarters, and a fifth of the sample
replaced each quarter. This is known as Quarterly LFS (QLFS) and it was
designed to produce cross-sectional data, such that in any one quarter, one
wave will be receiving their first interview, one wave their second, and so on,
with one wave receiving their fifth and final interview. Thus there is an 80%
overlap in the samples for each successive quarter. The UK LFS has existed
since the mid 1970’s but it is only since 1993 that data on gross earnings has
been collected, and only since 1997 has earnings been recorded in both waves
1 and 5.
In recent years it has been recognised that linking together data on each
individual across quarters would produce a rich source of longitudinal data,
therefore five-quarter longitudinal datasets have also been produced for the
same period, for example linking spring 1998 with spring 1999 and containing
data from all five waves of the survey. This is known as Longitudinal LFS
(LLFS), and because of the resources involved in production and the size
of the resultant datasets, the longitudinal datasets include only a subset of
the full LFS variable set. Since the focus of analyses of these datasets was
expected to be the population of working age, the datasets has also been
restricted to women aged 15 to 59 at the first quarter and men aged 15 to 64
at the first quarter. The reduced cross-sectional datasets have been matched,
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and all unmatched cases are dropped, as are all cases where there are no data
on economic activity, in any of the quarters. In our analysis we consider the
period 1997-2009 inclusive and we use the LLFS to exploit the panel feature
of the data.
Our procedure is the following. We first append all five-quarter LLFS
datasets from 1997 to 2009 and we obtain a total sample of 415,893 obser-
vations.5 The proportion of employees is around 64% (265,063), the self-
employed are around 7.5% (31,033), there is a small percentage of people
(less than 1%) in government training programs, the remaining people are
inactive in the labour market. We restrict the sample to be employees. We
drop individuals observed only in either the first or the fifth quarter, and
our sample size falls to 223,339. We drop missing wages and our remaining
sample is 211,038; however there is also a large number (around 60,000) of
individuals for whom the earnings variable is “no answer/does not apply”,
this restricts our sample to 150,353.6
We stack all QLFS datasets, from 1997 to 2009, which include around
125,000 individuals per quarter and in each quarter five waves of on average
25,036 individuals, and we obtain a total sample of 6,259,177 people wave
observations. If we restrict on the same age range used in the LLFS we get
around 18,000 individuals per wave in each quarter, and the proportion of
employees in each wave is around 61% (11,000) and self-employed are 7.8%.
Earnings are collected only in the first and fifth wave and the proportion
of employes reporting a positive wage is on average 73%, on average 7500
individuals in the first wave and a little less in the fifth wave. We therefore
keep only employees reporting a positive wage in the first wave and the new
sample is 369,652.7
Now we apply similar restrictions to both datasets. We only consider
people aged from 25 to 60 years old and born between 1940 and 1984 (we
loose 15% of the observations in QLFS and around 11% in LLFS), and the
new sample sizes are 314,169 and 134,412 in QLFS and LLFS, respectively.
The following groups were dropped from the analysis: residents of Northern
Ireland (3% in QLFS, 2% in LLFS ) and Scotland (9%, in both QLFS and
LLFS), people born outside UK (3% in LLFS, 8% in QLFS) people still
in full-time education or never had education, people that completed their
5LFS is a panel of addresses not people. Movers are not followed so attrition between
waves 1 and 5 accounts for the lower number of cases available for linking and higher
attrition, the original five-quarter datasets always contain fewer observations than the
QLFS datasets.
6This implies that the proportion of employes reporting positive earnings in both first
and fifth wave is 67%.
7This sample size corresponds to 1 wave per quarter for 50 quarters from 1997 to 2009,
but the last two quarters of 2009 were not available.
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education younger than 14 and older than 30 (0.3% in QLFS, there is no
equivalent variable in LLFS). The final sample size is 250,538 in QLFS and
111,522 in LLFS. The main variables of interest for our analysis are earnings,
education and individual characteristics. We constructed our variables in the
following ways.
Average gross hourly pay8 is provided in the LFS raw data. We further
restrict the total number of hours worked in the reference pay period to lie
in the range [0. . . 94] (loose less than 0.05%). The resulting hourly pay rate
is transformed into a real wage rate by dividing by the Retail Price Index
(All items) with September 2009 as the base period. The top and bottom 1%
of the wage distribution by category of highest academic qualifications were
trimmed to avoid outliers arising from measurement error in the wage rate
influencing the results unduly. Finally, it is generally more useful to consider
the proportional differences in earnings across different groups of individuals,
rather than the absolute difference. That is, as usual, we consider the log of
the wage rate rather than the wage rate itself.
Our analysis concentrates on education qualifications, rather than the age
at which individuals leave education. In England, compulsory education is
from the age of 5 to 16 with 5 to 10 being spent in primary school, and 11 to
16 spent in lower secondary education. Students undertake national exami-
nations, typically in five to ten subjects, known as the General Certificate of
Secondary education9 (GCSEs) at age 16. After the age of 16 they can enter
the labour market or continue into post compulsory upper secondary educa-
tion. Students can choose between academic and vocational qualifications.
The academic track consists of GCSEs at 16, followed by A-levels at 18 and
university undergraduate degree usually from the age of 19 to 22, possibly
followed by a postgraduate degree. There is a very clear ordered progression
along this academic education track. The vocational track is less easy to
characterize: typically students would leave formal education at the age of
16 and engage in some occupational training perhaps on a part-time basis
while at work, or attend some further education college on a full-time basis
for approximately two years gaining vocational qualifications before entering
8It is a derived variable defined as the ratio of usual earnings to usual hours (from main
job) including paid overtime. Usual earnings are obtained using information asked directly
to all employees and those on schemes, e.g. gross pay before deductions (self-assessed),
expected gross earnings (self-assessed). The proportion of non-response to the earnings
question is similar by education level and across each QLFS data set. Therefore there is
no concern for non-random non-response.
9We refer here to the education system after 1973. Prior to 1973 it was common
for tracking to start earlier and there was a distinction between the examinations that
vocational track pupils took. We convert these older qualifications into their modern
equivalents using conventional criteria.
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work. Many vocational qualifications are specialised and taken by rather
small group of individuals. Fortunately there is a well-developed method of
grouping equivalent qualifications into levels known as National Vocational
Qualifications (NVQ) equivalents. These are defined in Table 1 and divided
into five NVQ levels: from NVQ1 (below GCSE qualifications) to NVQ5
(postgraduate level qualifications)10. Table 1 gives examples of the voca-
tional qualifications and their associated NVQ levels, as well as the most
common non-vocational ones. We follow established practice in how NVQs
are defined with the exception that we pool together the NVQ4 and NVQ5
qualifications due to the small number of observations at NVQ5 level11. Our
omitted category is no qualifications. We generated the educational variables
separately and we observed the same proportion in both QLFS and LLFS.
Here we report the descriptive statistics that refer to the QLFS sample which
is larger and includes all of the individuals in the LLFS. The total sample
size of 250,538 comprises 120,387 males and 130,151 females.
Summary statistics and the distribution of the earnings given the NVQ
levels are provided in Table 2. Only those individuals earning a positive wage
are included in the sample. We observe that the largest group of individuals
(34% of males and 32% of females) have an NVQ4, whereas those with NVQ1
are very small. We also notice that males with NVQ3 are almost the double
of females. This probably due to the fact that we include both vocational
and academic qualifications and the percentage of females taking vocational
courses is very small compared to males.12 Comparing the wages at NVQ3
and NVQ2 males with the higher qualification earn 19% more than those
with NVQ2, this percentage drops to 10% for females. The wage differential
between NVQ4 (and 5) and NVQ3 is around 37% for males and 40% for
females, and it broadly corresponds to the “college premium” in the US
literature.
3 Estimation method
Belzil (2007) surveys the empirical literature concerned with estimating the
returns to schooling and show that since 1970 more than 200 published ar-
ticles and working papers have been devoted to this topic. It is well known
that OLS methods produce unbiased estimates only if realized schooling and
unobservable attributes that affect earnings are uncorrelated. The presence
10See Makepeace et al. (2003). In general NVQ3 corresponds to high school graduates
and below NVQ3 high school drop-out.
11We group NVQ4 and NVQ5 and we refer as NVQ4 hereafter.
12For a more detailed picture of the problem see Walker and Zhu (2007) who show the
NVQ distributions disaggregated by academic and vocational paths.
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of ability bias implies that estimates of the effect of education on earnings
reflects both the unobservable differences across individuals as well as the ef-
fect of education per se, so that OLS are biased upwards. It is commonly felt
that more highly educated individuals might earn more because they have
unobservable attributes, like ability, that are valued in the labour market
and which are correlated with education. As stressed by Walker and Zhu
(2008), we need to distinguish the average effect due to an additional year
of schooling, from the differences in earnings that occur, on average, across
individuals that have different levels of education.
The common solution to the empirical problem of estimating the true
causal effect of education is to exploit that part of the variation in education
levels across individuals that is not due to self-selection. In the literature
many studies use the IV approach, and Card (2001) surveys a number of
studies which use a variety of instruments: parental background (Willis and
Rosen, 1979); quarter of birth (Angrist and Krueger, 1991); college proximity
(Card, 1995); raising of the school leaving age (Harmon and Walker, 1995);
and WWII (Ichino and Winter-Ebmer, 1999).
IV methods seem to find, in general, returns to schooling between 20%
and 40% above the corresponding OLS estimate, which are typically slightly
larger than the estimates from selection models. One explanation for IV
estimates systematically exceeding the estimates of least sqaures, is the com-
bination of small ability bias (in IV), with downward bias in OLS estimates
due to measurement error in reported schooling (see Griliches, 1977; Angrist
and Krueger, 1991; Walker and Zhu, 2008). However it seems unlikely that
measurement errors in qualifications will be very large and we suspect that
this source of bias will be small.
An alternative explanation is that IVs provide, in terms of the Angrist,
Imbens and Rubin (1996) causal model, a Local Average Treatment Effect
(LATE) estimator, which estimates the effect for those whose treatment sta-
tus is affected by the instrument. LATE is the average effect of the treatment
for those who change treatment status because of a change in the value of
the instrument. An intervention does not affect all individuals in the same
way. Typically there is heterogeneity in the response to the treatment across
individuals. Consequently, there are different potential questions that eval-
uation methods attempt to answer, the most common is the average effect
on individuals of a certain type. Heckman and Vytlacil (1998) and Blundell
and Dias (2009) distinguish between: the population average treatment effect
(ATE), which would be the impact if individuals were assigned at random to
treatment; the average effect on individuals that were assigned to treatment
(TT); the effect of treatment on agents that are indifferent to participation,
which is the marginal version of the local average treatment effect (LATE)
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discussed above; or the effect of treatment on the untreated (TU) which is
typically an interesting measure for decisions about extending some treat-
ment to a group that was formerly excluded from treatment. Except for the
case of homogeneous treatment effect13 all these measures are conceptually
different and each has a different set of conditions for identification.
Moffit (1999) gives a simple graphical interpretation of these estimators.
Figure 1 shows a hypothetical density of αi (with mean α¯) in the population,
where αi is the heterogenous treatment response for individual i, and it is
also known as random coefficient. Moffit assumes that selectivity takes place
strictly on αi and that selection is positive. This means that individuals
with higher αi are more likely to participate in the treatment - the mono-
tonicity assumption. More precisely those with αi above the cutoff point α
∗
participate and the other individuals do not. In Figure 1, the parameter α¯ is
the ATE. Whereas αTT is the TT, the average gain of those who participate
E(α|αi > α∗), and αTU is the mean gain of non participants in case of treat-
ment E(α|αi < α∗). To represent the LATE we need to consider a discrete
changes in α∗ to α∗
′
, which changes αTT to αTT
′
. The LATE is given by the
the difference αTT − αTT ′ divided by the area under the curve between α∗
and α∗
′
, which is the change in the probability of participating.
While Blundell et al. (2005) estimate a multiple treatment model in a sep-
arable framework, here we estimate the effect of multiple treatment without
separability by estimating one equation per qualification. Since the differ-
ence in estimated constant terms gives a rate of return, and the constant term
has an additive error, our model effectively allow for heterogenous treatment
effects.
Rather than use IV estimation and face the problem of interpretation,
we adopt the more restrictive Heckman selection model, extended to allow
for an ordered choice across several education levels. Of course, a selection
model is more restrictive than IV since it assumes that the distribution of
unobservables in both wages and schooling are jointly normal distributed.
Our educational variables can be ordered - so that NVQ4 is higher than 3,
and higher than 2 and so on. Therefore, we can estimate the probability that
individuals have an NVQ at any particular level and exploit the fact that they
are mutually exclusive - so that the probabilities of having each level sum to
one across levels. The main difference from IV methods, is that by making
an assumption about the distribution of the unobservable determinants of
earnings we estimate the effect of qualifications on hourly wages across the
whole distribution of unobservables, in particular at the mean. Thus, the
selection model method, unlike IV, yields estimates that are comparable to
13Under this assumption all these measures are identical.
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the much simpler least squares regression method14.
In our analysis we use a first difference model of hourly wage to estimate
the lifecycle effects for separately each level of education, exploiting the fact
that our data have a short panel element. Estimating in first difference using
only the panel element of the 1997-2009 data allows us to identify the lifecycle
pattern of wages independently of any cohort trends providing those cohort
effects are fixed effects in the data. That is, provided that cohort effects in
the cross-section equation are additively separable from lifecycle (age) effects.
We estimate this difference equation separately for each education level to
avoid imposing separability. Implicit in estimating in differences using OLS
is the presumption that unobserved ability affects wages only through the
level and not through an effect on growth. This is a common assumption in
the literature, but not an innocuous one because ability that is unobserved
early in life may become revealed to employers later in life (e.g. Altonji
and Pierret, 2001). Our attempts to correct for selection effect in the wage
growth equation, in the same way as we approach selection in levels, did not
suggest that this was a statistically significant issue.
Moreover, our model does not impose the restriction that the selectivity
works in the same way at all NVQ levels. We do not impose the restric-
tion that the age profiles (and the region and race effects) are the same at
each level of NVQ. So we allow for non separability in the earnings function
between the schooling effect and the age effect.
3.1 Model
Our baseline model is a conventional human capital earnings function except
that it is separable in education level. Thus equation 1 is written for each of 5
levels of education, and is modeled as the sum of quadratic age effects, cubic
cohort effects (c captures additively separable cohort effects through a cubic
year of birth), time effects and individual error term15. Equation 2 simply
differences equation 1. Equation 3 imposes the estimates of the lifecycle
parameters from 2.
Wisq = cs + δsageisq + ρsage
2
isq + µst+ uisq (1)
∆Wisq = (δs + µs) + 2ρsageisq + νisq (2)
14We estimate the first difference and wage level equations in two steps. This is equiv-
alent to a single step SUR but less efficient.
15The standard Mincerian model assumes that log earnings are quadratic in experience.
We do not have a good measure of experience, people use age minus schooling which puts
an interaction term.
12
Wis = ̂(δs + µs)t+ ρ̂sage2is + cs + βsSis + γsXis + is (3)
S∗is = ωs + ψsZis + vis (4)
where W is the log of wages, i = 1 . . . N individuals, s = 0 . . . 5 educational
levels, q = 1, 5 LFS quarter, cs = c0s + c1syob + c2syob
2 + c3syob
3, t = LFS
survey year and Sis = 1 if S
∗
is = s. We also assume E[uis] = E[vis] =
E[is] = 0, but cov(vis, is) 6= 0, then E[Sisis] 6= 0, vis and is follow a
bivariate Normal distribution.
The estimation of 1 is difficult because individuals’ age added to their
birth year gives the current year, so that there is an exact linear relationship
between the age, cohort, and time effects.
However, the interval period between the first and the fifth LFS wave is
around 1-year, we can take the first difference of 1 and remove all the time
invariant effects, thus controlling for time-invariant unobserved individual
heterogeneity. In equation 2 wage growth is linear in age (our measure of
experience) for each education classification, therefore we are not imposing
separability between age and schooling. Lifecycle effects on earnings are given
by the constant term, which is a cumulative effect of age and time, and ρ
which corresponds to the effect of age squared in 1. We can obtain consistent
estimates of the parameters ρ and δ + µ from 2 providing selection bias is
driven only by fixed effects and cohorts effects are additively separable in 1.
We impose these consistent estimates on 1 and then estimate the remaining
parameters using the selection model represented in equations 3 and 4. We
can recover all the coefficients except we cannot separately identify µ from
δ.
The selection model estimates an ordered probit as the first step, equa-
tion 4, where the vector Z includes at least some variables that are not
contained in X. As discussed by Heckman (1990) and Card (1994) identi-
fication in selection models (as for IV) has to be able to include variables
that affect education and do not also affect earnings directly, the so-called
exclusion restrictions.
We use the estimated probit coefficients from equation 4, to generate the
relevant Inverse Mills Ratios (IMR), which capture the likelihood that an
individual has a particular level of qualification. We include these IMRs in
the wage equation 3 to correct for the fact that individuals with a particular
level of education will have a particular unobserved component to earnings.
We include an ethnic variable, also used in the ordered probit, and we assume
a cohort effect for each education classification. Thus, our final specification
13
allows the intercept and the coefficients on the controls to vary by schooling
qualification.
We estimate log earnings for each NVQ level using regressions, which
allows heterogeneity in the effect of qualifications on earnings16, of the form
Wis = θis + ρ̂sage
2
is + (δ̂s + µs)t+ λsÎMRis + βsXis + is (5)
where θis = c0s + (c1s − δs)yobi + c2syob2i + c3syob3i for i = 0 . . . N and s =
NV Q0 . . . NV Q4.
As mentioned above, the identification strategy requires an exclusion re-
striction in the vector X. In the absence of such, the selection variables will
coincide with the independent variables, i.e. Z = X, and, while we could
still use the two-step procedure and obtain the estimates of the IMR, their
identification would come only from the distributional assumptions. It is well
known that such estimates would be sensitive and would rely exclusively on
the assumption that the IMR is a non-linear transformation of the same
regressors X as in the outcome equations (Heckman, 1979).
In a traditional two-step selection model with only two outcomes in the
participation equation, a standard t−test on the coefficient, λ, of the IMR
is a valid test of the null hypothesis of no selection bias. We would expect
a positive λ, which means that more highly educated individuals might earn
more because they have unobservable attributes, like ability and persever-
ance, that are valued in the labour market and which are positive correlated
with education. In our model, with multiple treatments, the IMR represents
the correlation between a particular level of education compared to all the
others, therefore a significant coefficient can be interpreted as evidence of
selectivity but the sign of this coefficient does not have as clear an interpre-
tation as in the binary model.
3.2 Exclusion restrictions
Our identification strategy is based on the exclusion in the wage equation 3
of two variables that we think can reasonably be considered to be exogenous
and affect wages only through education. The first variable is the raising of
the school leaving age reform (RoSLA): those born before August 1958 faced
a minimum school leaving age of 15 years, those born after that date were
required to stay in school until at least 16 years of age. As shown by Har-
mon and Walker (1995) RoSLA can be used both as IV and as an exclusion
restriction in a selection model. Oreopoulos and Page (2006) estimates the
16We use the Stata routine ”oheckman” written by Chiburis and Lokshin (2007).
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LATE for secondary schooling exploiting the high drop out rates in the UK
and using RoSLA as an IV. They find large gains from compulsory schooling.
These estimates are not very different from those of US and Canada, although
the proportion of people affected by the change in compulsory schooling in
the UK was much higher than that in North America.
In Figure 3 we show for both males and females, born before and after
the RoSLa, the percentage difference in the probability of obtaining a given
NVQ qualification conditional on having a lower NVQ. As expected the effect
of RoSLA is bigger for low levels of education, the probability of having an
NVQ1 and NVQ2 is very high conditional on having no qualification or an
NVQ1, respectively. This was indeed the purpose of the reform, to increase
participation for those that would otherwise have not remained at school. If
we consider just those born 5 years either side of the reform, to reduce the
extent to which there are cohort trends, we find that the reform immediately
reduced the probability of leaving school at the old minimum, 15, from ap-
proximately 30% to zero and that the probability of leaving school, at the
new minimum rose immediately from approximately 30% to approximately
60%. The distribution above leaving at 16 remained unchanged (see Figure 2
and Chevalier et al., 2004).
The second exclusion restriction is month of birth. In the literature it is
well documented that there is an impact of date of birth on cognitive test
scores, with the youngest children in each academic cohort year performing
poorer, on average, than the older members of their cohort. Puhani and
Weber (2005) use a sample of German children and investigate the impact
of age at school entry on test scores at the end of primary school (age 10).
They find that children who start school aged 7 rather than aged 6 have test
scores that are 0.42 standard deviations higher at the end of primary school.
Bedard and Dhuey (2006) use internationally comparable data for OECD
countries to estimate the impact of relative age on test scores at ages 9 and
13. They find that children being one month older get higher test scores at
the age of 9 than at age 13. Ashworth and Heyndels (2007) consider the
effects of month of birth in soccer education programs. They find system-
atic differences in players’ performance depending on the months in which
they are born. These differences could conceivably produce productivity and
wage differences in adulthood. Crawford et al. (2007) is a recent example
that notes the relationship between month of birth and educational attain-
ment in the UK.17 They show that children born later in the school year
17The English rule for admission says that children have to start school at the beginning
of the term following their 5th birthday. There are three terms: start September, start
January, start April. However what happens in all Local Education Authorities is that
children start at the beginning of the academic year during which they will turn 5. So
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perform significantly worse in exams than those born earlier in the school
year, even up to GCSE level (NVQ2 level). A child born in September will,
on average, perform better in academic tests than a child born in the fol-
lowing August, simply because they start school (and sit the tests) up to
a year younger18. This means that access to further and higher education,
and hence future success in the labour market, is likely to be affected by the
month in which they are born. Indeed, Figure 4 shows, for males and females
respectively, the percentage difference in the probability of obtaining a given
NVQ qualification conditional on having a lower NVQ, for those born in
September and August. The probability of having an NVQ1 conditional on
having no qualification is lower for the oldest males and females in a school
cohort (September born children). This because they have a higher proba-
bility to get a higher qualifications compared to the youngest children in the
same school cohort (August born children). Formal tests of the validity and
strength of our instruments suggest that we do not have a weak instrument
problem. We assume the effect of month of birth on education is linear to
improve the precision of our first stage estimates. That is, we set month of
birth = [1...12] for September-August.
4 Estimation Results
4.1 Ordered probit first step results
We exclude month of birth and RoSLA from the wage equations. Both vari-
ables are in principle uncorrelated with the unobservable determinant of the
earnings. The two exclusion restrictions satisfy the condition of the random
assignment to treatment, in terms of the Angrist et al. (1996) causal model.
We think of RoSLA as being a regression discontinuity once we control for
social changes through the inclusion of a cubic in the year of birth. Indeed,
it seems that there was almost complete compliance with RoSLA in England
and Wales. And in the same way, month of birth of an individual, accord-
ing to recent studies (e.g. Hoogerheide et al., 2007 and Kleibergen, 2002)
appears to be uncorrelated with other covariates, unconditionally. Unlike
almost all children start school in September whilst aged 4, in what is called the Reception
(kindergarten) class. Then they will be aged 5 by the time the school year ends in August
31st and at the start of Year 1. If children do not start until age 5, then they will start in
Year 1 rather than Reception. And if they start Reception (kindergarten) in January or
April, the only adjustment is in how much time they have in Reception. As this class is
not so different from nursery school etc, this should not be an issue to use month of birth
as exclusion restriction.
18Crawford et al. (2007) show that September born children have on average 0.2 year
more education than August born children.
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Buckles and Hungerman (2008) we cannot analyze the relationship between
month of birth and family background with our data. However, we feel that
the weight of evidence suggests that month of birth only has indirect effects
on log wages - through the level of educational achievement. We also include
in both the wage and education equations self-reported ethnicity (grouped
simply into white and non-white).
In Table 3, we report the results of the first step of our estimation, i.e
the ordered probit selection equation. We include, in this stage, a cohort
effect represented by a cubic function of the year of birth to capture long run
social changes, as distinct from the sharp effect of RoSLA. This social change
turns out to be quite significant for educational attainment. The month of
birth effect is captured by including a continuous month variable, where
the omitted month is September which corresponds to the oldest children in
each class cohort. We find, as expected, that its sign is negative and highly
significant indicating that the oldest children in each class do better.19.
We show, in Table 4, the marginal effects of RoSLA and month of birth
evaluated by each level of education. The coefficient of RoSLA is significantly
positive from NVQ0 to NVQ3, and it has its highest values at NVQ0 and
NVQ2. The intention of the government and the consequent effect of the
policy was to increase the participation at the lower secondary levels of edu-
cation, and it is here where we find the strongest effect of the RoSLA. Note
that if we had used RoSLA as an IV then the estimated effect of the NVQ
would be weighted towards those at the bottom of the education distribution
- e.g. for those who wanted to leave at 15 and the policy forces to remain
in school until 16. In contrast, in our selection model, we estimate the effect
on the mean. Looking at the month of birth, we notice that the coefficient
is significantly positive and decreasing from NVQ0 to NVQ3, as expected,
while it is significantly negative at NVQ3 and NVQ4: youngest children have
a higher probability of achieving only lower levels of education, while older
children in each class have a higher probability of attaining higher levels.
19To assess the stability of our exclusion restrictions we estimated the selection model
applying one restriction at a time, and we have found that the results are substantially
unchanged when using only RoSLA, while the model does not converge when using only
month of birth. We have also performed pairwise comparison of different education levels
by estimating separate probit models. The results show a stronger of effect of RoSLA and
month of birth at lower levels of education, around 10 times the marginal effects obtained
with the ordered probit; while the effects are much smaller at higher NVQ levels, also
lower than ordered probit marginal effects.
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4.2 Heckman estimation
To better interpret our results we show in Table 5 the estimation of the
second step of the selection model where the dependent variable is raw log
wage (i.e. without any age effect correction from a first difference model) and
we allow for age effects and no cohort effects. This can be seen as a more
conventional approach for the estimation of the selection model.
In Table 6 we report the results of the estimation of equation 2 and in
the last column we present the estimates when we include the education
variables, the purpose is to perform a test of non separability and, again,
we reject the null of separability, so we are confident that the conventional
separable model can be rejected in favour of of our non-separable one20. We
also include the OLS estimates of log hourly earnings on quadratic age, using
QLFS data only. In particular, we want to contrast the lifecycle earnings
profile estimated without cohort effects from the pooled cross section data
with the estimates of lifecycle earnings profiles estimated when we allow
for additive cohort effects using the panel data. The estimates from the
first difference model are immune from cohort effects, that is the effect of
experience from being employed 1 year. The traditional estimates of the
model without cohort effects generate lifecycle effects that are contaminated
by the omitted cohort effects. Notice that age is not as good a proxy for
experience for women as it is for men.
Finally, in Table 7 we show the estimation with the wages corrected for
lifecycle effects and we include cubic year of births that capture additive
cohort effects. The first important difference is the coefficient of the IMR,
λ, which in Table 5 is always significant for females (except NVQ2), and
significant at NVQ0, NVQ3 and NVQ4 for males.21 This means that our
exclusion restrictions are detecting and correcting for the presence of selection
bias. In Table 7, we notice that λ is never significant for males, this suggests
that the selection bias, in terms of unobserved fixed effects, has already been
removed in the first difference estimation of the log wages (i.e. equation 2).
For females, we still find evidence of sample selection, although less strong
than in Table 5.22 The coefficients of the cubic year of births are not reported,
but the cohort effects are always jointly significant (we tested these effects
both by and across NVQ levels), and this confirms that when we separately
estimate the life cycle effects we identify cohort effects unconfounded by
collinearity.
20We have also tested the model using cubic age effects, however this effect is mostly
insignificant and an F test of the significance of the cubic in all NVQ levels rejects this
extension.
21See tests on joint significance of λ at the bottom of Table 5.
22See tests on joint significance of λ at the bottom of Table 7.
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4.3 Predicted Wages and Age-Earnings Profiles
In our ordered probit selection models (that assume that educational qualifi-
cations are correlated with the unknown factors that determine earnings) the
returns to schooling do not appear among the estimated coefficients of the
wage equation. They can be obtained from the estimated increments to pre-
dicted earnings that are associated with the successive levels of NVQ - that
is, from the constant terms. In Table 8 we compare the average predicted
wages obtained from the two selection models estimated.
In the top panel of Table 8 we report the average predicted wages (from
the estimation in Table 5), which include age effects but no cohort effects.
In the middle panel we show the predicted wages (from the estimation in
Table 7) which do not include age effects, since the log wages have been
explicitly corrected for them, but allow for cohort effects. We notice that
the predicted wages from the more conventional approach are higher, for
both males and females, compared to our new approach. In the bottom
panel of Table 8, we show the wage differences by NVQ levels, under the
two selection models23. Looking at the college premium, it is line with the
literature: females get a higher premium of around 42% while for males
the premium is around 37% in model a, while the premiums are 29% and
36% in model b for males and females, respectively. The returns to NVQ3
versus NVQ2 are much higher for males than females, in model b. This
is consistent with our raw data, since we have more males with vocational
qualifications than females. As we stated above, in the selection model we are
estimating the effect of education on earnings across the whole distribution
of unobservables, in particular at the mean. In fact, if we add back to the
fitted wages in model b the age effects estimated in equation 2, we obtain
returns to education in the two selection models that are practically the same.
However, the fact that the at mean the predicted earnings are similar does
not imply the absence of differences across the entire distribution. Indeed,
to highlight these differences we compute the age-earnings profiles.
Figure 5 shows the profiles obtained from the raw pooled data, that is
from the OLS estimation (see Table 6) using quadratic age with discrete
schooling groups and no cohort effects. These profiles are identical24 to those
obtained from the estimation (see Table 5) of the conventional selection model
with age effects only. In Figure 5, we observe the well-know convex shape of
the profiles, where for males the peak is at age 45 with a college premium
of around 40% whilst for females the peak is at 46 years old with a college
23For simplicity, we call model a the conventional selection model and model b the new
approach.
24For this reason we do not report them.
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premium higher than 40%. It is evident that the age-earnings profile for
NVQ4 is higher than NVQ3 at all ages, and steeper than NVQ3 at early
ages for both males and females. Notice that we find that women with low
qualification levels have flatter lifecyle wage profiles.
Figure 6 shows the profiles obtained from the estimation in Table 7 when
controlling for life cycle effects but assuming no cohort differences. We ob-
serve increasing profiles, which implies strong age effects throughout lifecycle
for all educational levels. This clearly contrasts Figure 5, because now we
have profiles where age effects are immune from cohort effects (see Table 6).
Finally, in Figure 7 we show our last set of profiles which combine all our
extensions to the simple workhorse specification used in the literature. We
consider discrete groups of educational qualifications, we control for lifecy-
cle effects and we separately allow for cohort differences. We find two clear
results, the age earnings profiles are flat and younger cohorts have smaller
college premiums compared to older cohorts, for both males and females. In
Figure 8 we report the returns to education for high school (NVQ3 minus
NVQ2) and higher education (NVQ4 minus NVQ3) for the age groups in the
overlapping cohorts showed in Figure 7. For example, a 44-year-old gradu-
ate male (female) from the cohort 1950-55 has a college premium of around
50% (43%) while at the same age a graduate male (female) from the cohort
1960-65 has a premium of 36% (35%). Whereas, a 36-year-old graduate male
(female) from the cohort 1960-65 has a college premium of around 33% (34%)
while at the same age a graduate male (female) from the cohort 1970-75 has
a premium of 17% (29%). Looking at the gender differences, males from the
older cohort have higher college premiums than females; the premiums are
almost similar for the middle cohort, while females from the younger cohort
have a bigger premium than males.
5 Conclusion
This paper has proposed and implemented a simple methodology, to estimate
the returns to education, that is sufficiently tractable that it could used with
many datasets, and yet provides a significant generalisation of the usual ad-
ditively separable and linear human capital earnings function. We separately
estimated lifecycle and cohort effects, and identification was achieved through
exploiting an education reform and month of birth. While the former is well
known there are few examples of the latter. Both have significant effects
on educational attainment. Our results amount to a strong rejection of the
simple workhorse specification that is commonly used in this literature and
we hope that our own specification will, ultimately, replace this workhorse
20
to provide the departure point for further extensions.
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Table 1: NVQ Equivalent Qualifications
Source: Walker and Zhu (2007)
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Table 2: Summary statistics
Males
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
log hourly wage (Sept09 prices) 2.474 0.487 0.786 4.060 116913
RoSLA 0.627 0.484 0 1 119700
age 41.364 9.577 25 60 119700
year of birth 60.688 9.888 40 84 119700
month of birth 6.392 3.42 1 12 119700
non white 0.982 0.134 0 1 119700
Females
Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. N
log hourly wage (Sept09 prices) 2.198 0.486 0.781 4.059 127696
RoSLA 0.626 0.484 0 1 129874
age 41.43 9.497 25 60 129874
date of birth year 60.715 9.838 40 84 129874
date of birth month 6.394 3.415 1 12 129874
non white 0.98 0.142 0 1 129874
log hourly wage and NVQ percentage
Males
Mean Std. Dev. %
NVQ0 2.105 0.360 10.35
NVQ1 2.183 0.358 5.23
NVQ2 2.343 0.417 19.16
NVQ3 2.434 0.413 30.89
NVQ4 2.807 0.458 34.37
Females
Mean Std. Dev. Perc.
NVQ0 1.829 0.329 13.82
NVQ1 1.925 0.333 7.30
NVQ2 2.075 0.385 30.27
NVQ3 2.174 0.418 16.17
NVQ4 2.589 0.441 32.44
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Table 3: First Step - Selection model: ordered probit
Dep var: NVQ levels
Males Females
month of birth -0.00164* -0.00371***
(0.00095) (0.00090)




year of birth 0.39362*** 0.48996***
(0.03444) (0.03353)
(year of birth)2 -0.00631*** -0.00753***
(0.00059) (0.00057)















Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1%
std. err. in brackets.
Ho: yob=yob2=yob3=0, rej at 1%
LR χ2(3)=535.66 for males
LR χ2(3)=3365.56 females.
Ho: rosla=month of birth=0, rej at 1%
LR χ2(2)=17.72 for males















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 5: Estimates Heckman model - no cohort effects
Dep var: log earnings
Males
NVQ0 NVQ1 NVQ2 NVQ3 NVQ4
λ 0.84652*** 0.41899 -0.23196 1.43493*** 1.24955***
(0.31514) (0.35749) (0.20949) (0.35164) (0.34213)
age 0.04829*** 0.05772*** 0.06048*** 0.08089*** 0.10276***
(0.00542) (0.00597) (0.00354) (0.00642) (0.00476)
age2 -0.00058*** -0.00067*** -0.00063*** -0.00104*** -0.00119***
(0.00008) (0.00009) (0.00005) (0.00009) (0.00007)
non white -0.04467 -0.02572 0.08839** -0.19812*** -0.12682***
(0.05323) (0.06687) (0.03886) (0.06705) (0.04700)
constant 2.66633*** 1.50969*** 0.74473*** 1.14093*** -0.50060
(0.55700) (0.45248) (0.16755) (0.10345) (0.36733)
N 105086
Females
NVQ0 NVQ1 NVQ2 NVQ3 NVQ4
λ -0.45159*** -0.04212 -0.41407*** -0.81721*** -0.24505***
(0.09318) (0.09766) (0.07309) (0.11931) (0.08964)
age 0.01695*** 0.00012 0.01500*** 0.03733*** 0.04109***
(0.00359) (0.00378) (0.00241) (0.00400) (0.00217)
age2 -0.00006* 0.00007* -0.00004 -0.00023*** -0.00040***
(0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00003) (0.00005) (0.00003)
non white 0.00921 -0.10179*** -0.01622 0.11228*** 0.02980
(0.03561) (0.03869) (0.02619) (0.04329) (0.02168)
constant 0.48442* 1.85177*** 1.39843*** 1.14213*** 1.85605***
(0.26261) (0.21604) (0.10942) (0.12122) (0.05805)
N 117136
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1% Std. err. in brackets.
Dependent Variable in 2009 prices.
Ho: λ0 = · · · = λ5 = 0 χ25 = 39.81 for males; χ25 = 110.16 for females;
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Table 6: First difference model from LLFS and OLS from QLFS
Males
NVQ0 NVQ1 NVQ2 NVQ3 NVQ4 NVQ tot
Dep var: first difference log hourly earnings - LLFS
2×age -0.00053*** -0.00024 -0.00046*** -0.00052*** -0.00077*** -0.00059***









constant 0.09120*** 0.07553*** 0.09042*** 0.09468*** 0.12758*** 0.09636***
(0.01872) (0.02302) (0.01156) (0.00933) (0.00869) (0.00667)
N 4889 2688 9394 16309 17739 51019
Dep var: log hourly earnings - QLFS - OLS modela
age 0.03848*** 0.05703*** 0.06584*** 0.06643*** 0.09829*** 0.07566***
(0.00339) (0.00495) (0.00276) (0.00212) (0.00220) (0.00120)
age2 -0.00041*** -0.00062*** -0.00070*** -0.00076*** -0.00107*** -0.00083***
(0.00004) (0.00006) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00001)
N 11047 5612 20464 33233 36882 107238
Females
NVQ0 NVQ1 NVQ2 NVQ3 NVQ4 NVQ tot
2×age -0.00012 -0.00039* -0.00040*** -0.00055*** -0.00061*** -0.00046***









constant 0.05293*** 0.09432*** 0.08722*** 0.10067*** 0.11566*** 0.08534***
(0.01801) (0.01844) (0.00921) (0.01217) (0.00913) (0.00654)
N 7935 4532 17973 8992 18774 58206
OLS model
age 0.00458 0.00285 0.01320*** 0.03051*** 0.04300*** 0.02318***
(0.00290) (0.00362) (0.00201) (0.00285) (0.00214) (0.00111)
age2 -0.00002 0.00003 -0.00013*** -0.00037*** -0.00047*** -0.00024***
(0.00003) (0.00004) (0.00002) (0.00003) (0.00003) (0.00001)
N 16531 8691 36198 19262 38852 119534
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1% Std. err. in brackets. Dependent Variable in 2009 prices.
LLFS: Test on separability for males rej. Ho at 5%, Fstat=5.744; for females rej. Ho at 5%, Fstat=6.013
NVQ tot is a categorical variable for each NVQ level.
aBasic OLS model with no cohort effects
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Table 7: Estimates Heckman model - with cohort effects
Dep var: log earnings corrected for lifecycle effects
Males
NVQ0 NVQ1 NVQ2 NVQ3 NVQ4
λ -0.17056 -0.03264 -0.00466 0.22527 0.32310
(0.34337) (0.39332) (0.24308) (0.19223) (0.30438)
non white 0.08216 0.04533 0.04851 -0.00744 0.00195
(0.05829) (0.06748) (0.04123) (0.03477) (0.03622)
constant 10.28976*** 8.86501*** 8.22799*** 7.47121*** 9.79283***
(2.27805) (3.27755) (2.11201) (1.81581) (2.47798)
N 105088
Females
NVQ0 NVQ1 NVQ2 NVQ3 NVQ4
λ -0.30541* -0.69032*** -0.22152* 0.14598 -0.52381**
(0.18251) (0.29960) (0.14273) (0.18735) (0.24716)
non white -0.00096 0.08612 -0.06634* -0.13125*** 0.09897***
(0.05135) (0.09033) (0.03957) (0.05313) (0.04576)
constant 7.62182*** 19.72844*** 15.21160*** 11.63619*** 21.77756***
(1.76624) (3.92310) (1.8370) (2.59009 ) (2.76227)
N 117140
Significance levels : ∗ 10% ∗∗ 5% ∗ ∗ ∗ 1% Bootstrapped Std. err. (500 reps) in brackets.
Dependent Variable in 2009 prices. All equations include cubic year of births that capture
additive cohort effects. Age effects are imposed from Table 6, according to equation 5.
Ho: λ0 = · · · = λ5 = 0 χ25 = 3.80 for males; χ25 = 26.88 for females;
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Table 8: Predicted wages
Selection Model a with age effects and no cohort effects
Males Females
Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev
NVQ0 2.10580 0.04469 1.82674 0.02884
NVQ1 2.18321 0.07158 1.92295 0.04664
NVQ2 2.34460 0.08971 2.07269 0.03076
NVQ3 2.43373 0.07026 2.17044 0.04195
NVQ4 2.80956 0.12422 2.58901 0.05654
Selection Model b with cohort effects and lifecycle correction
Males Females
Mean Std. dev Mean Std. dev
NVQ0 2.10297 0.27735 1.65489 0.0838
NVQ1 1.89639 0.15235 1.72606 0.21022
NVQ2 2.10852 0.27909 1.8362 0.19759
NVQ3 2.31797 0.27186 1.92789 0.27214
NVQ4 2.61111 0.45962 2.28441 0.35534
Wage differences by NVQ
Males Females
SM a SM b SM a SM b
NVQ1-NVQ0 0.07741 -0.20657 0.0962 0.07117
NVQ2-NVQ1 0.16139 0.21212 0.14975 0.11014
NVQ3-NVQ2 0.08913 0.20945 0.09775 0.0917
NVQ4-NVQ3 0.37583 0.29314 0.41857 0.35651
a Predicted wages and differences from Table 5.
b Predicted wages and differences from Table 7.
Note: If we add the age effects to the predictions in model b
we obtain average wage predictions similar to model a.
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NVQ1|NVQ0 NVQ2|NVQ01 NVQ3|NVQ012 NVQ4|NVQ0123
Note: Each NVQ level is conditional to previous levels achieved.
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Note: Each NVQ level is conditional to previous levels achieved.
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